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Fiscal decentralization as a delegation form of fiscal authority from the 
central government to the regional government is expected to accelerate the 
regional economic growth in accordance with the respective characters in 
each region. The overspreading potency in utilizing the transfer funds from 
the central government is more likely to be higher if the regional budget is 
not designed effectively and efficiently to support the acceleration of 
regional economic activities. This study aimed at investigating the influence 
of unconditional grant, regional revenue, gross regional domestic product, 
and population density towards the regional budget in East Java Province 
during the implementation of fiscal decentralization. Model specification 
used was an overview of regional budget, in which the flypaper effect was 
detected by comparing the coefficient of unconditional grant regression and 
the regional revenue. It was done by using econometric-model panel data for 
33 districts in East Java Province during 2001 – 2005. By using fixed-effect 
model estimation, this study figured out that there was a flypaper effect 
indicated by the higher elasticity number of unconditional grant than of 
regional revenue towards the regional budget in East Java Province. 
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 An authority delegation to the regional government becomes an initial step 
to the regional autonomy. Indonesia as a democratic country has embarked the 
regional autonomy since the issuance of the Regulation Number 25 of 1999 and 
the Regulation Number 33 of 2004 on Financial Balance between Central 
Government and Regional Government. Despite this kind of autonomy delegation 
triggered by economic and political crisis (Balisacan et al., 2008), the impact on 
authority delegation could stimulate the economic growth (Anis & Ardi, 2007). 
 Fiscal decentralization implemented by Indonesia in post-reformation era 
more focuses on the authority delegation of revenue and budget. The regional 
government as the executor of regional budget is perceived having perfect 
information on which sector from the budget allocation that could possibly 
accelerate the economic growth. In the other side, however, the regional authority 
on fiscal has decreased. During the regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization, 
the regional government acts as a tax collector under the higher government. The 
impact on this policy is that regional revenue is gradually diminishing, despite 
lower revenue converted into transfer funds provided by the central government.  
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 Fiscal decentralization concerning on the allocation of regional budget will 
lead to the allocation inefficiency (Neyapti, 2010). The regional revenue derived 
from the transfer of General Allocation Funds and Revenue Sharing Funds can be 
utilized for daily budget or others. The potency of inefficient budget use is likely 
to emerge from the regional authority in allocating the regional revenue, including 
the transfer funds. 
 Along with the increase of regional budget, the percentage of transfer 
funds proposed to the central government is steadily increasing. The regional 
government has an authority to increase the transfer funds proportion for their 
respective regions. This proportion is clearly stated in Article 27 of the Regulation 
Number 33 of 2004 in which the regional government could apply for additional 
transfer funds from fiscal gap owned by the regional government. 
 A region without fiscal capability in fulfilling the regional budget demands 
higher number of transfer funds from the central government. The fiscal gap 
emerged in a region may be due to the low regional revenue, the higher personnel 
expenses, or other factors causing the disparity between the revenue and budget. 
There is allegedly an inefficient allocation leading to the fiscal gap which then 
increases the allocation of regional transfer funds in several districts in East Java. 
 The financial management referring to the expenditure function creates 
potential inefficiency of budget allocation. The externalization in this such 
decentralization can be employed for several regions to take an advantage on the 
central government’s fiscal overflow. In terms of expenditure, the authority 
delegation for fiscal management given by the central government to the regional 
government has several drawbacks: 1) the regional government could hardly 
achieve the economic scale in providing public goods due to higher cost of 
information and coordination as a result of the deficiency of institutional and 
administrative capacity; 2) in a case of the high number of local interest, this such 
decentralization could lead to massive corruption and social fragmentation due to 
the absence of local accountability; 3) the decentralization could increase the 
political tension and competition among regional governments; 4) the distinct 
coordination issues among different government levels could steer the deficit bias 
and thus restrain the fiscal reformation and the macro-economic adjustment 
(Neyapti, 2010). 
 The amount of funds given by the central government differ among 
regions. The higher proportion of transfer funds in the regional revenue shows the 
higher domination of the central government in the regional revenue. The impact 
of immense financial gap between the regional revenue and transfer funds from 
the central government increases the regional dependency in covering the fiscal 
gap. In terms of fiscal jurisdiction, the authority separation of taxation and budget 
may obscure the regional taxation assessment on both costs and benefits from 
public budget.  
 The fiscal gap covered by transfer funds is perceived easier revenue source 
by the regional government. Due to this assumption, the regional budget will be 
higher than the optimum level so that the flypaper effect will emerge as over-
spending indicator in the local level (Aragon, 2012). Theoretically, the budget 
amount provided by either central or regional government could enhance the 
economic growth. In short-term period, the acceleration of economic growth can 
indeed be triggered by consumption activities; it, however, could be optimally 
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done if the allocated budget is merely addressed to the budget that is likely 
accelerating the economic activities. 
 Based on the elaborated assumption above, it can be formulated several 
problematics; one of which is whether the flypaper effect could happen in the 
regional government of several regions in East Java Province. This study aimed at 




 The concept of fiscal decentralization aims at adjusting the principles of 
regional economic development based on the regional government partially 
financed by national budget stipulated in the transfer funds. The authority to 
manage the transfer funds from the central government to the regional 
government is expected to accelerate the regional development based on 
respective characters and necessities. The overview of transfer impact on the 
structure of regional fiscal is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 1. The Transfer Impact on the Regional Budget 
Source: Stiglitz (2000) 
 
 Figure 1, illustrates the transfer impact on the regional fiscal. As the 
concept of consumption theory where the satisfactory level on goods and services 
is correspondently increasing with the increase of revenue depicted by the budget 
line shift, the regional fiscal especially on the public and private goods can only 
be increased if there is a positive change in the regional fiscal. In the figure 1, the 
increase of regional fiscal due to the transfer funds is illustrated by budget line 
that is formerly on the BB line shifting into B’B’ line. 
 The increasing regional revenue from the transfer funds provides a wide 
fiscal clearance so that the regional government could increase their budget to 
provide various public goods. The shift on E into E’ line shows the shift of 
consumption level on the combination between public and private goods. 
 The increase of balanced funds which could ultimately lead to the increase 
of regional budget revenue can be derived from 3 major sources: sharing funds, 
general allocation funds, and special allocation funds. In the concept of fiscal 
decentralization, the increase of budget from the balanced funds derived from 
sharing funds mainly becomes a main purpose as well as a solid indicator of 
regional fiscal independency, for instance the development acceleration in a 
 
Private good 
Budget line after transfer 
Budget line before transfer 
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district could certainly improve both land and building taxes received by the 
central government. According to the Regulation Number 33 of 2004, 64.8% of 
90% budget is fully addressed to the regional government. 
 The amount of balanced funds can also be added from general allocation 
funds based on fiscal gap and basic allocation calculated from the total salaries of 
Regional Civil Servants. From the wide range of regional revenue sources apart 
from the Regional Own Revenue (PAD), the flypaper effect could happen if the 
balanced funds, especially those from non-regional revenue are higher than the 
increased regional revenue. Referring to the Regulation, it has also been stated 
that fiscal gap could be covered by the balanced funds so that the regional 
motivation to decrease the fiscal gap of regional own revenue (PAD) or the 
balanced funds from the sharing funds does not become the main reference. 
 The transfer policy from the central government affects not only on the 
decrease of budget issues encountered by a community but also on the policy 
efficacy due to the overacting bureaucratic behaviors in responding the financial 
assistance. This such perspective, furthermore, is considerably based on the 
empirical observation on the impact of incomes and grants towards the regional 
budget. The transfer expectedly lowers the tax burden on local community 
corresponding to the fiscal assistance from the central government; the 
bureaucracy, however, with its budget authority takes an advantage to set a higher 
budget followed by an increase of local taxes and therefore creates a fiscal 
phenomenon known as flypaper effect. 
 According to Wilde (1968); Kuncoro (2004), the flypaper effect can be 
recognized through the theory of consumption behaviors as illustrated in Figure 
2.2 and 2.3. The transfer is noticeably classified into two types: conditional grant 
and unconditional grant. In conditional grant, the increase of consumption as a 
result of transfer acceptance is due to the price effect lowering the price of public 
goods and thus flatters the slope of budget line from Y into Y + transfer. 
 
 
Figure 2. The Impact of Conditional Grants on Goods Consumption 
Source: Kuncoro (2004) 
 
 The decrease of prices heightens the consumption of public goods from Z0 
to Z1. The regional budget, moreover, will be increasing to meet the community 
demands for public goods. Meanwhile, the conditional grants towards the 
consumption of private goods solely depend on the government policy after 
receiving the transfer. If the transfer acceptance decreases the local taxes, the 
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increase of demand for both public and private goods occurs as a result of the 
substitution of local tax burden with the transfer acceptance from the central 
government. 
 The flypaper effect mainly occurs in the unconditional grants (Allers & 
Vermeulen, 2016). This type of transfer acceptance is supposed to substitute the 
local tax burden leading to the increase of consumption for both public and 
private goods. However, in this case, the transfer occurrence does not prove the 
decreasing tax burden; instead, the increasing transfer acceptance occurs along 




Figure 3. The Impact of Unconditional Grants on Goods Consumption 
Source: Kuncoro (2004) 
 
 The acceptance of unconditional grants shifts the budget line to the right of 
Y to Y + transfer. The decline of budget issues also shifts the consumer balance 
from E0 to EM. In this point, the consumption of public goods is illustrated by Z1 
while the consumption of the private ones is illustrated by X1. However, number 
of researchers figured out the anomaly illustrating that community balance after 
the transfer acceptance exists in EFP (not in EM). It indicates that the transfer 
acceptance rather increases the local tax revenue (+TR) due to the increasing 
consumption of public goods (from Z1 to Z2) vis-à-vis the decreasing consumption 
of private goods (from X1 to X2). Therefore, the flypaper effect appears as a result 
of the transfer acceptance that leads to the increasing consumption of public goods 
yet does not substitute the local taxes (Dahlby & Ferede, 2016). 
 According to Tresch (2014), an empirical analysis on the flypaper effect 
lays on two basic principles: 1) Bureaucratic Model representing how the regional 
government responds the given grants to provide varied public services; and 2) 
Median-Voter Model representing how the median voter is supposed to respond 
the given grants as the way a common consumer receives an individual transfer 
and hence decreases the budget issues encountered. 
 The bureaucratic model as explained by Niskanen (1971) has to be 
perceived as another individual maximizing the satisfaction including salary, a 
number of employees, and social reputation. As an individual, a bureaucrat is 
indeed not in neutral position on the budget drafting process. Therefore, he tends 
to yield bigger services or goods than what is supposed to be and ergo seems 
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 The analysis (Niskenan, 1971) on bureaucratic behaviors in determining 
















Figure 4. The Economic Analysis on Bureaucracy 
Source: Mangkoesoebroto (2004) 
 
  Curve CGD represents the demand curve while the curve LRMC=LRAC 
represents the marginal and long-period average costs assumed to have structure 
of constant costs. In other side, MR is the curve of acceptance marginal. If the 
goods are produced by private monopoly companies, the provided output level 
should be represented by OQ1 while its prices are represented by P1. Therefore, 
the obtained profits are P1CBP2, or the companies that do not get profits will yield 
the output level represented by OQ2 and its costs are represented by P2. 
 If the output, however, is provided by the bureaucrat under the budget 
authority as much as OP2AQ3, the obtained output will be represented by OQ3 due 
to the bureaucratic behaviors tending to optimize the budget; and therefore, the 
output provided by either monopoly companies or government could create 
respective welfare loss as much as CBF by monopoly companies and FAG by 
government. Furthermore, the phenomena of flypaper effect in the bureaucratic 
model appears as a result of the regional bureaucratic behaviors in over 
determining the regional budget, especially due to the practice of soft budget 
constraint from the central government in form of transfer funds or grants. 
 In terms of median-voter model, the flypaper effect is described through 
the perspective that the transfer funds are used as other revenue for an individual. 
Grants are supposedly allocated between local public and private goods based on 
revenue elasticity from median voters (Dahlberg et al., 2008). The Figure 2.4 
describes the flypaper effect as adopted from Bradford a& Oates (1971) in 
(Wyckoff, 1988) following the Median-Voter Model. The Figure 2.5 illustrates 
the impact of unconditional grants as much as A which results the shift of median-
voter budget line to the top right but does not influence the slope of budget line (-
T). Due to the static slope of tax share in pre and post transfer funds, the 
increasing revenue from transfer funds leads to the shift of budget balance 
between public and private goods. This could happen if the voter’s preferences are 
free from varied properties of budget constraint. In this perspective, the increasing 
transfer A triggers the increase of regional revenue TA. 
 
Price:cost 
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Figure 5. Median-Voter Model 
Source: Wyckoff (1985) 
 
 In the other side, however, the median voter is supposed to be an 
individual actively participating the local decision-making process who could call 
demand for varied community resources (including the general assistance from 
the central government) as his rights. If the assistance is used to lower the local 
taxes, this individual will receive higher T number from the post-transfer revenue. 
By acting as the dominant actor in local politics, the median voter could favorably 
shift the resources inside or outside the public sector by converting the transfer 
proportion equal to the public budget and the burdened tax rates (Stiglitz, 2000a). 
 A study by Kuncoro (2004) investigating the transfer impact on fiscal 
performance of the regional governments in Indonesia figures out that the 
increasing transfer allocation is followed by the higher budget growth due to the 
inefficiency of regional budget, especially in routine budget. Implicitly, this 
indicates the higher authority for the regional government to allocate the transfer 
funds from the central government, especially for the unconditional grants as one 
of the causes for the irrelevant use of fiscal assistance whether in terms of the 
number and type of budgets. 
 In analyzing the regional budget (Kuncoro, 2004), the econometrical 
approach with the data from districts in Indonesia during 1988 – 2002 should be 
used to classify the budget into two types: 1) routine budgets; and 2) development 
budgets. These two variables are used as the dependent variables while the 
acceptance from varied types of transfer, population, income level, district’s 
characteristics, and institutional factors as the control variables. Econometrically, 
it can be formulated as follows: 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑1∆𝑈𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑2∆𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑3∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑4∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑5∆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑6𝐷𝐴𝑈𝐺 +  𝑑7𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐺
+ 𝑑8𝐷𝑘𝑜𝑡𝑎 +  𝑑9𝐷𝑘𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑑10𝐷𝑜𝑑𝑓 + 𝑑11𝐸𝐶𝑇4𝑖𝑡−1+
+ 𝜇4𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (2.1) 
and 
 
∆𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒1∆𝑈𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒2∆𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒3∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒4∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒5∆𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒6𝐷𝐴𝑈𝐺 + 𝑒7𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐺
+ 𝑒8𝐷𝑘𝑜𝑡𝑎 +  𝑒9𝐷𝑘𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑒10𝐷𝑜𝑑𝑓 +  𝑒11𝐸𝐶𝑇5𝑖𝑡−1+
+ 𝜇5𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (2.2) 
 
In which, RE is the routine budget and DE is the development budget. This study 
(Kuncoro, 2004) indicates the occurrence of flypaper effect in the regional budget 
in which the increasing unconditional grants are perceived by the regional 
government by utilizing the Regional Own Revenue (PAD). 
 Public expenditure 
Private Good 
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 Furthermore, Widarjono (2006) explains that the regional budget and the 
occurrence of flypaper effect by using province-level data during 1995 – 2002 as 
one of the bureaucratic behaviors in setting or determining the budget. To 
perceive this flypaper effect phenomena, Widarjono (2006) describes the regional 
budget as the function of Regional Own Revenue (Y), Transfer Funds or Grants 
(Tr), and Population (Pop) and detects the occurrence of flypaper effect based on 
the comparison between the value of coefficient β1 and β2 from the equation 2.3 
below: 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑1∆𝑈𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑2∆𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑3∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑4∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑5∆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑6𝐷𝐴𝑈𝐺 +  𝑑7𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐺
+ 𝑑8𝐷𝑘𝑜𝑡𝑎 +  𝑑9𝐷𝑘𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑑10𝐷𝑜𝑑𝑓 + 𝑑11𝐸𝐶𝑇4𝑖𝑡−1+
+ 𝜇4𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (2.3) 
and  
  
∆𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒1∆𝑈𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒2∆𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒3∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒4∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒5∆𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒6𝐷𝐴𝑈𝐺 + 𝑒7𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐺
+ 𝑒8𝐷𝑘𝑜𝑡𝑎 +  𝑒9𝐷𝑘𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑒10𝐷𝑜𝑑𝑓 +  𝑒11𝐸𝐶𝑇5𝑖𝑡−1+
+ 𝜇5𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (2.4) 
 
 The Widarjono’s analysis (2006) shows that the occurrence of flypaper 
effect with regression coefficient β1 > β2 can be described through the bureaucratic 
model that significantly uses its authority in over setting or determining the 
budget policy due to the transfer funds. Meanwhile, a study by Iskandar (2012) 
identifies the response of regional budget on unconditional grants by using 
district-level data during 2004 – 2008 in West Java Province. This study figures 
out that there is no flypaper effect. The model used in this study is presented as 
follows: 
𝐵𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑈𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑃𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑃𝐷𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … (2.6) 
 
 The estimation result of the equation 2.6 shows the response of regional 
budget as a result of the increase of Regional Own Revenue (PAD) that is higher 
than the transfer funds of central government. Therefore, there is no flypaper 
effect in the regional budget of West Java Province. A study conducted by 
Wyckoff (1985) examines the bureaucratic model in explaining the flypaper effect 
on the budget of several districts in Michigan 1970 by using this following model 
(2.7): 
ln 𝐸 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1 ln 𝑃𝑜𝑝 + 𝑏2 𝑙𝑛 𝑇 + 𝑏3𝑙𝑛 𝑍 + 𝑏4𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 + 𝑏5𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐼𝐷 
+𝑏6𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝑏7𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁 +  𝑏8𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝑏9𝑃𝐸𝑅65𝐴𝑂 + 𝜀. (2.7) 
 
In which E represents all types of budget in the regional government unless for 
water, electricity, gas, and transportation services. Pop is a city population, T is 
tax share, Z represents the total revenues of median vote, ICRATIO is a revenue 
proportion obtained from sharing revenue (T), DENSITY represents the 
population density, PEROWN represents a percentage of citizens who have their 
own house, PERNOWN represents non-white population, and PER65AO 
represents total population aged above 65 years old. 
 This study offers significant contribution, especially in terms of 
recognizing how the existing theoretical concept could explain the flypaper effect 
in the regional budget. The existence of bureaucratic authority in setting or 
determining the regional budget is examined by using two methodologies 
comprising parameter b1 and b4. Coefficient b1 shows the population elasticity 
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towards the regional budget reflecting the budget response on the cost of 
providing public services as the representation of bureaucratic model about 
flypaper effect. Meanwhile, the coefficient b4 shows the elasticity of grants 
acceptance portion as a part of individual revenues towards the regional budget 
representing the median-vote model. 
 
METHOD  
 This study aimed at investigating the flypaper effect phenomena during the 
fiscal decentralization era by using the OLS approach with the secondary data 
derived from the Statistical Bureau (BPS), the Directorate General of Regional 
Fiscal Balance and the Directorate General of Regional Fiscal, and other relevant 
sources. The data in this study were Regional Own Revenue including Regional 
Tax Revenue, APBD, PDRB, Indonesian Statistics, Population, and other relevant 
data. This study, moreover, was conducted from 2012 to 2014 in 38 districts of 
East Java Province. 
 It concerned on the flypaper effect in several districts of East Java 
Province with the secondary data comprising regional budget, general allocation 
funds, tax-sharing funds, density, and regional own revenue. The analysis was 
done by means of econometrical approach with the panel data aiming at 
describing the pattern of district budget in East Java Province. To detect the 
occurrence of flypaper effect, it was used the model development from three 
previous studies (Iskandar, 2012; Widarjono, 2006; Wyckoff, 1988). Further, the 
econometric model developed from the referred model is formulated as follows: 
 
ln 𝑃𝐿 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1 ln 𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝑏2 𝑙𝑛 𝑈𝐺 + 𝑏3𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐷𝑅𝐵 +  𝜀 
𝑃𝑡𝐿 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1 𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝑏2 𝑈𝐺 + 𝑏3 𝑃𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏4𝑃𝐷𝑅𝐵 +  𝜀 
 
PL represents the total of direct regional budgets while PtL represents the indirect 
budgets. UG is the unconditional grants consisting of General Allocation Funds 
(DAU) and Tax-Sharing Funds (DBHP). PAD represents the regional own 
revenue and PDRB represents gross regional domestic products. Last, density 
represents the population density in every district. 
 Considering numerous estimation techniques for the panel model, several 
statistical analyses were conducted in this study, such as: Chow-test and 
Hausman-test to get more suitable model as probe. Chow-test was used to 
determine whether the model is better estimated by using model of pooled least 
square or fixed effect. Meanwhile, the Hausman-test was used to choose either 
fixed effect or random effect approach as the relevant method. The hypothesis of 
Chow-test is formulated as follows: 
H0 : Pooled Least Square model 
H1 : Fixed Effect model 
 The decision on above hypothesis was done by comparing the F-statistical 
calculation with F-table. The comparison would be used if the F-result was higher 
than F-table; and ergo, the H0 was rejected and the Fixed Effect model had to be 
used as the suitable model. Meanwhile, the Hausman-test was formulated under 
this following hypothesis: 
H0 : Random Effect model (REM) 
H1 : Fixed Effect model (FEM) 
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 If, furthermore, the chi square value > the chi square table, the p-value 
would be significant and thus H0 was rejected and the Fixed Effect model had to 
be used. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 To obtain the best model, the Lagrange Multiplier test was used. The result 
of LM test showed that pooled model was better applied to the spatial 
econometrics, either for spatial lag or spatial error. This conclusion was 
determined from the -value = 0.05. 
 
Table 1. LM-Test                                               Table 2. Hausman-Test 
LM-Test Probability value 
LM Lag 34.471** 
LM error 18.773** 
Robust LM lag 27.432** 
Robust LM lag 22.712** 
Source: processed data               Source: processed data 
** Significant at 𝛼 0,05               ** Significant at 𝛼 0,05 
* Significant at 𝛼 0,01                                          * Significant at 𝛼 0,01 
 
 After selecting the best model, the next phase was determining whether 
fixed effect was better than random effect by using Hausman-test. From the result 
of the test, it was gained that the appropriate panel model for both spatial lag and 
error was random effect due to their insignificant probability values.           
 The R2 test was used to investigate the estimated regression model. The R2 
value of panel model in spatial lag could demonstrate its ability in explaining the 
variable Y. The R2 value gained in this test was 0.999 or 99.9% which indicated 
that variable X could explain variable Y. 
 The selection of Fixed Effect method as the best model based on Chow-
test necessarily required the next probe for the equation 3.1 by using random 
effect. Further, it compared two methods to yield the best model based on 
Huasman-test. The estimation result by using Random Effect is illustrated in the 
table below: 
 
Table 3. Regression Output with Fixed Effect Method 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
C 0,573932* 0,332336 
PAD 0,052872* 217.8177 
UG 0.012891* 7.684174 
POP 0.035507* 105.6116 
PDRB -0.007665* -30.78134 
F-statistic             0,0000000 
R2             0,999749 
N                 111 
 Note: * significant regression coefficient at α = 1% 
 
 Regression output showed the determination coefficient R2 = 0.99 
indicating that 99% variation of the district budget in East Java Province can be 
explained by the shift of unconditional grants, Regional Own Revenue (PAD), 
Gross Regional Domestic Product (PDRB), and Population (Pop). Therefore, the 
 Statistic value 
Hausman for spatial 
lag 
25.234 
Hasuman for spatial 
error 
27.832 
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model was perceived good to explain the pattern of regional budget supported by 
the probability value of F-statistic that is lower than alpha value 0.05. Besides, the 
regression with random effect resulted the consistent parameter coefficient under 
the OLS technique in which the UG, PAD, PDRB variables significantly 
influenced the regional budget under the credibility interval =1%. Meanwhile, 
the population did not significantly influence the regional budget as what had 
been described in the regression result by using Fixed Effect method. 
 The unconditional grants significantly influenced the district budget in 
East Java Province 2012 – 2015. The value of regression coefficient 0.012891 
indicating that the increase of unconditional grants by 1% (ceteris paribus 
assumption) by the regional government will increase the district budget in East 
Java Province by 0.012891%. The significant impact of unconditional grants on 
the regional budget related to the findings of previous studies (Wyckoff, 1985; 
Kuncoro, 2004; Widarjono, 2006; Iskandar, 2012). 
 The description of correlation between the transfer funds from the central 
government and the regional budget relied on the budget sources in which the 
transfer funds was one component of the regional budget sources. As a budget 
source, the transfer funds from the central government acted as the major 
component of district budget source in East Java Province. This fact can be 
elaborated through this following table: 
 
Table 4. Transfer Ratio towards Total Acceptance Districts in East Java Province 
District 2012 2013 2014 2015   District 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bangkalan  67% 62% 62% 58%   Pamekasan 67% 66% 57% 52% 
Banyuwangi 67% 66% 59% 55%   Pasuruan 67% 67% 54% 52% 
Blitar 67% 62% 60% 56%   Ponorogo 68% 68% 62% 59% 
Bojonegoro 81% 70% 69% 71%   Probolinggo 67% 71% 64% 56% 
Bondowoso 68% 113% 63% 57%   Sampang 70% 71% 69% 61% 
Gresik 60% 50% 47% 42%   Sidoarjo 52% 50% 46% 38% 
Jember 67% 65% 59% 57%   Situbondo 73% 66% 60% 59% 
Jombang 69% 65% 60% 55%   Sumenep 77% 77% 68% 61% 
Kediri 71% 72% 61% 54%   Trenggalek 69% 69% 73% 59% 
Lamongan 64% 66% 64% 56%   Tuban 68% 69% 61% 55% 
Lumajang 73% 72% 61% 55%   Tulungagung 61% 67% 72% 54% 
Madiun 69% 70% 65% 60%   Blitar  71% 68% 69% 64% 
Magetan 72% 72% 63% 58%   Kediri City 72% 77% 61% 59% 
Malang 65% 68% 59% 54%   Madiun City 78% 68% 64% 56% 
Mojokerto 64% 64% 55% 48%   Malang City 64% 56% 54% 52% 
Nganjuk 68% 69% 65% 54%   Mojokerto City 74% 78% 66% 60% 
Ngawi 75% 71% 69% 59%   Probolinggo city 70% 71% 64% 58% 
Pacitan 68% 68% 68% 61%   Surabaya City 32% 28% 24% 21% 
            Batu City 86% 77% 60% 56% 
Source: Data Processed, 2016 
  
During 2012 – 2015, the transfer contribution on the district budget in East 
Java Province ranged from 26 to 71% of the total regional budgets. The amount of 
unconditional grants towards the total district revenue made this variable 
dependent in the budget structure. Averagely, more than 70% of the district 
budget in East Java Province was funded by transfer funds from the central 
government in form of the general allocation funds and tax-sharing funds. In the 
other side, the decentralization practice merely focusing on the budget function in 
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the lack condition of regional fiscal brought huge consequence for the central 
government in managing the transfer policy to decrease the gap between regional 
revenue and budget. This attempt was indeed their responsibility in implementing 
the fiscal decentralization policy in accordance with the regional autonomy. 
 In the micro-economy concept, the consumer’s behaviors on how they 
maximize the utilization of public goods provided by the regional government can 
be perceived as the community’s satisfaction towards the regional government in 
fulfilling the community’s necessities, for instance: hospital, roadway, public 
facilities, and government services in varied sectors. 
 The provision of both public goods and services was from the regional 
budget. The higher revenue the regional government could obtain, the higher 
potency of the regional budget would be. Hence, it is expected that the regional 
government could shift their budge mainly to the provision of public goods. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.2, the higher budget the regional government could set 
including those from transfer funds, the lower price of public goods must be; 
therefore, the community consumption on the public goods could increase and 
ultimately improve its utilization. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that there was a 
flypaper effect in the regional budget in East Java Province during 2012 – 2015. It 
was indicated by the elasticity of unconditional grants that was higher than the 
elasticity of Regional Own Revenue (PAD) towards the regional budget. 
Intuitively, the higher transfer elasticity represented the responsive regional 
bureaucracy on the shift of transfer acceptance to increase the budget compared to 
the regional own revenue. The excessive bureaucratic behaviors will always 
demand the increase of transfer acceptance despite the steady mobilization of 
internal funds. Following the bureaucratic model, flypaper effect in the regional 
budget in East Java Province was mainly caused by the dominant transfer funds 
from the central government in the structure of regional revenue which therefore 
leads to the regional bureaucracy. In this case, the regional government with their 
budget authority seems to be more responsive towards the transfer acceptance. 
The perspective on excessive bureaucratic behaviors tending to yield the higher 
output than the optimal level supported by the budget probability in the balanced 
fiscal scheme, especially for the general allocation funds and tax-sharing funds, 
offered the regional authority in allocating the budget. Considering the findings of 
this study that illustrate the significant impact of population towards the regional 
budget in East Java Province, the correlation transmission for these both variables, 
especially in a case of transfer funds from the central government, had considered 
the population variable in the calculation analysis. The regional government is 
expected to steadily increase the regional taxes despite the increase of transfer 
funds from the central government. Besides, the authority separation of revenue 
and budget between the central and regional government in the decentralization 
practice emerges as another important issue of flypaper effect due to the 
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